

# Fault-Tolerant Computing

Motivation,  
Background,  
and Tools



# About This Presentation

This presentation has been prepared for the graduate course ECE 257A (Fault-Tolerant Computing) by Behrooz Parhami, Professor of Electrical and Computer Engineering at University of California, Santa Barbara. The material contained herein can be used freely in classroom teaching or any other educational setting. Unauthorized uses are prohibited. © Behrooz Parhami

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
# Terminology, Models, and Measures for Dependability



THE PROBLEM IS YOUR MODEM CAN'T INTERFACE WITH YOUR ISP BECAUSE YOUR RJ 11 CABLE NEEDS UPGRADING

WILL IT COST MUCH?

THAT DEPENDS ON WHETHER YOU KNOW I JUST SAID "YOU NEED A LONGER PHONE CORD"



**"Every time we successfully recover from a technical problem, the computer likes a high five."**



**"That foul smell is coming from your computer. You've got some old data in there that's gone bad."**

# Impairments to Dependability

Flaw

Fault

Hazard

Bug

ERROR

Degradation

Defect


Failure

Intrusion

Crash


Malfunction

# The Fault-Error-Failure Cycle




Schematic diagram of the Newcastle hierarchical model and the impairments within one level.

# The Four-Universe Model



Cause-effect diagram for Avizienis' four-universe model of impairments to dependability.

# Unrolling the Fault-Error-Failure Cycle



Cause-effect diagram for an extended six-level view of impairments to dependability.



# Multilevel Model

Component



Logic

Information

System

Service


Result



# Analogy for the Multilevel Model

An analogy for our multi-level model of dependable computing.

Defects, faults, errors, malfunctions, degradations, and failures are represented by pouring water from above. Valves represent avoidance and tolerance techniques. The goal is to avoid overflow.



# Why Our Concern with Dependability?

Reliability of  $n$ -transistor system, each having failure rate  $\lambda$

$$R(t) = e^{-n\lambda t}$$

There are only 3 ways of making systems more reliable


Reduce  $\lambda$

Reduce  $n$

Reduce  $t$

**Alternative:**

Change the reliability formula by introducing redundancy in system



# Highly Dependable Computer Systems

## **Long-life systems: Fail-slow, Rugged, High-reliability**

Spacecraft with multiyear missions, systems in inaccessible locations

Methods: Replication (spares), error coding, monitoring, shielding

## **Safety-critical systems: Fail-safe, Sound, High-integrity**

Flight control computers, nuclear-plant shutdown, medical monitoring

Methods: Replication with voting, time redundancy, design diversity

## **High-availability: Fail-soft, Robust, High-availability**

Telephone switching centers, transaction processing, e-commerce

Methods: HW/info redundancy, backup schemes, hot-swap, recovery

Just as performance enhancement techniques gradually migrate from supercomputers to desktops, so too dependability enhancement methods find their way from exotic systems into personal computers

# Aspects of Dependability

**Serviceability**

**Security**

**Safety**  
Risk, consequence

**Resilience**

**RELIABILITY**  
Reliability,  $MTTF = MTFP$

**Availability**  
Pointwise av., Interval av.,  
MTBF, MTTR

**Testability**  
Controllability,  
observability

**Performability**  
Performability, MCBF

**Integrity**

**Robustness**

**Maintainability**

# Concepts from Probability Theory

**Probability density function: pdf**

$$f(t) = \text{prob}[t \leq x \leq t + dt] / dt = dF(t) / dt$$

**Cumulative distribution function: CDF**

$$F(t) = \text{prob}[x \leq t] = \int_0^t f(x) dx$$

**Expected value of  $x$**

$$E_x = \int_{-\infty}^{+\infty} x f(x) dx = \sum_k x_k f(x_k)$$




**Variance of  $x$**

$$\begin{aligned} \sigma_x^2 &= \int_{-\infty}^{+\infty} (x - E_x)^2 f(x) dx \\ &= \sum_k (x_k - E_x)^2 f(x_k) \end{aligned}$$


**Covariance of  $x$  and  $y$**

$$\begin{aligned} \psi_{x,y} &= E[(x - E_x)(y - E_y)] \\ &= E[xy] - E_x E_y \end{aligned}$$

Lifetimes of 20  
identical systems



# Some Simple Probability Distributions



# Reliability and MTTF


## Reliability: $R(t)$

Probability that system remains in the “Good” state through the interval  $[0, t]$

$$R(t + dt) = R(t) [1 - z(t) dt]$$

|  
Hazard function

Two-state nonrepairable system



$R(t) = 1 - F(t)$  ----- CDF of the system lifetime, or its unreliability

Constant hazard function  $z(t) = \lambda \Rightarrow R(t) = e^{-\lambda t}$   
(system failure rate is independent of its age)

Exponential reliability law

## Mean time to failure: MTTF

$$\text{MTTF} = \int_0^{+\infty} t f(t) dt = \int_0^{+\infty} R(t) dt$$

Expected value of lifetime

Area under the reliability curve  
(easily provable)



# Failure Distributions of Interest

## Discrete versions

**Exponential:**  $z(t) = \lambda$

$$R(t) = e^{-\lambda t}$$

$$\text{MTTF} = 1/\lambda$$

**Geometric**

$$R(k) = q^k$$

**Rayleigh:**  $z(t) = 2\lambda(\lambda t)$

$$R(t) = e^{(-\lambda t)^2}$$

$$\text{MTTF} = (1/\lambda) \sqrt{\pi} / 2$$

**Weibull:**  $z(t) = \alpha\lambda(\lambda t)^{\alpha-1}$

$$R(t) = e^{(-\lambda t)^\alpha}$$

$$\text{MTTF} = (1/\lambda) \Gamma(1 + 1/\alpha)$$

**Discrete Weibull**

**Erlang:**

$$\text{MTTF} = k/\lambda$$

**Gamma:**

Erlang and exponential are special cases

**Normal:**

Reliability and MTTF formulas are complicated

**Binomial**

# Comparing Reliabilities

**Reliability difference:**  $R_2 - R_1$

**Reliability gain:**  $R_2 / R_1$

**Reliability improvement factor**

$$RIF_{2/1} = [1 - R_1(t_M)] / [1 - R_2(t_M)]$$

Example:

$$[1 - 0.9] / [1 - 0.99] = 10$$

**Reliability improv. index**

$$RII = \log R_1(t_M) / \log R_2(t_M)$$


**Mission time extension**

$$MTE_{2/1}(r_G) = T_2(r_G) - T_1(r_G)$$

**Mission time improv. factor:**

$$MTIF_{2/1}(r_G) = T_2(r_G) / T_1(r_G)$$

Reliability functions  
for Systems 1/2



# Availability, MTTR, and MTBF

## (Interval) Availability: $A(t)$

Fraction of time that system is in the “Up” state during the interval  $[0, t]$

## Steady-state availability: $A = \lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} A(t)$


## Pointwise availability: $a(t)$

Probability that system available at time  $t$

$$A(t) = (1/t) \int_0^t a(x) dx$$

Availability = Reliability, when there is no repair

Two-state  
repairable  
system



Availability is a function not only of how rarely a system fails (reliability) but also of how quickly it can be repaired (time to repair)



$$A = \frac{\text{MTTF}}{\text{MTTF} + \text{MTTR}} = \frac{\text{MTTF}}{\text{MTBF}} = \frac{\mu}{\lambda + \mu}$$

Repair rate  
 $1/\mu = \text{MTTR}$   
(Will justify this equation later)

In general,  $\mu \gg \lambda$ , leading to  $A \cong 1$

# System Up and Down Times

Short repair time implies good **Maintainability (serviceability)**



# Performability and MCBF

## Performability: $P$

Composite measure, incorporating both performance and reliability

## Simple example

Worth of “Up2” twice that of “Up1”

$p_{Up_i}$  = probability system is in state  $Up_i$

$$P = 2p_{Up2} + p_{Up1}$$


$$p_{Up2} = 0.92, p_{Up1} = 0.06, p_{Down} = 0.02, P = 1.90$$

(system performance equiv. To that of 1.9 processors on average)

Performability improvement factor of this system (akin to RIF) relative to a fail-hard system that goes down when either processor fails:

$$PIF = (2 - 2 \times 0.92) / (2 - 1.90) = 1.6$$

## Three-state degradable system





## Question:

What is system availability here?

# System Up, Partially Up, and Down Times

Important to prevent direct transitions to the "Down" state (**coverage**)



# Integrity and Safety

## Risk: Prob. of being in “Unsafe Failed” state

There may be multiple unsafe states, each with a different consequence (cost)

## Simple analysis

Lump “Safe Failed” state with “Good” state; proceed as in reliability analysis

## More detailed analysis

Even though “Safe Failed” state is more desirable than “Unsafe Failed”, it is still not as desirable as the “Good” state; so keeping it separate makes sense

For example, if a repair transition is introduced between “Safe Failed” and “Good” states, we can tackle questions such as the expected outage of the system in safe mode, and thus its availability

## Three-state fail-safe system

